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1. China Is Catching up 
 
China’s leap 
 Recently Chinese goods have been expanding their share in the world market 
while Japanese ones showing signs of being outdone. The year of 1996 became a 
borderline when the world market shares of steel and air conditioners manufactured in 
China exceed those of Japan’s. In 2000 China surpassed Japan in the world market share 
of mobile phones manufacturing. China’s economic growth looks outstanding even 
amidst the growth of Asia as a whole.  
Figure 1. The world production share of Asian countries and regions
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 Let us see Figure 1. It shows Asian countries and regions’ share in the world 
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market. Besides the products mentioned before the world market share of color TV sets 
manufactured in China has exceeded 25 percent, the share of DVD-players has reached 
52 percent. In 1999 the share of automobiles manufactured in China stood at 3.3 percent 
which was small. However the world automakers including the Japanese ones have all 
at once shown activity related to the perspectives of the Chinese market. There is high 
possibility of rapid growth in China’s car manufacturing in the nearest future.      
 Only thirty years passed since Asia was called a “global factory”. And only 
several years passed since the same words began to be used in relation to China. The 
Chinese manufacturing gained momentum. It could be compared to a fire brought to the 
hearth of Asian forge.  
 There has been no unanimous opinion on China’s leap. Some accept it as real 
and argue that China is becoming “global factory”. Yet others judging from the flow of 
China’s intermediate capital and capital goods say that this is an overestimation, and 
China’s real competitiveness is still a matter for the future. Let us examine China’s 
recent growth taking into account that there exist different opinions on it. 
 
The astounding growth of Shanghai 
 The city of Shanghai is the symbol of China’s economic growth. Since 1993 
Shanghai’s average annual economic growth rate has been 12.5 percent which is much 
higher than China’s 9.7 percent during the same period. Meanwhile, the symbol of 
Shanghai’s growth is the area of Pudong on the eastern bank of the Huangpu River. 
Formerly a rural area it has developed since 1990 into a big modern city. 
 In the 1990s the Chinese government has been promoting the development of 
Pudong Area as a government project. In a very short period Pudong turned into an 
urbanized high-tech and finance center bristling with skyscrapers where European, 
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American, and Japanese companies pressed about business. In the same way as since 
the 1960s the Tokyo Tower symbolized Japan’s economic progress, the 468-meter 
Oriental Pearl TV Tower on the eastern bank of the Huangpu River became a symbol of 
Shanghai and China’s leap. 
 In ten years of the 1990s there were constructed six thousand buildings in 
Shanghai while it received thirty billion US dollars of foreign investment. Shanghai and 
adjacent areas molted into the richest part of China. Shanghai and three adjacent 
provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Anhui, which make Shanghai Economic District, 
produce 23 percent or about a quarter of China’s GDP. In China Shanghai holds the first 
place in the GDP per capita (30,674 yuans) while Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces are 
among the top six. This area, which is called Greater Shanghai, comprises the 
population of two hundred million, which is approximately what Japan, South Korea, 
and Taiwan host altogether.  
 Then why Shanghai Economic District made such a rapid progress? First the 
leading role was with the foreign investments. As of 2001 foreign investments on the 
contract base to Shanghai totaled 7.37 billion dollars. With its 1.32 billion dollars (18 
percent) Japan tops the list of the investors, followed by Hong Kong with 780 million 
dollars (10 percent), and the USA with 600 million dollars (8 percent). According to the 
latest data from 2002 there were 1,059 Japanese companies in Shanghai operating in 
transport, finance, service, real estate, construction, etc., and in manufacturing 
especiallyi. Many practices which have almost been abandoned in Japan, such as 
“quality circles” (the activities of small groups at the working places to improve quality), 
company travel, and company sport clubs, are widely enjoyed in the Japanese 
companies there.  
 Yet the main cause of the rapid growth was the area’s strong attractiveness to 
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foreign investors. First of all the area abounds with capable labor force. There is an 
almost inexhaustible supply of young migrant workers from rural areas to Shanghai in 
the same way as to other Chinese maritime cities. However Shanghai has got an 
educational infrastructure which can produce young high-educated human resources. 
Shanghai is second to only Beijing in terms of university graduates per 100,000 of 
population. Shanghai has been a financial and industrial center even before the World 
War II. It has everything from strong local financial institutions to governmental 
enterprises and rural small-size private businesses. In other words everything is in full 
set there. 
 Furthermore as a city under Beijing’s direct government Shanghai takes the 
head in the reforms and opening policy. Shanghai began the industrialization by foreign 
capital several years later than for example Shenzhen. Yet Shanghai’s enrooted 
traditions coupled with the attraction of foreign capital brought Shanghai at the head 
even surpassing those who started earlier.  
 
Big computer production base 
 There are no words to express the potentiality of Shanghai. With an abundance 
of high-educated human resources with engineer background Shanghai is best qualified 
for placing high-tech industries especially computer manufacturing there. Indeed in the 
recent years Japanese and Taiwanese computer makers have one after another built 
plants and begun manufacturing in Greater Shanghai. 
 At present Greater Shanghai with Guangdong area grouping around the Zhu 
Jiang River’s delta is a biggest computer production base in the world. The capacity 
seems to be unlimited. The linear motor train line between Pudong International Airport, 
which is called the face of Shanghai, and the city’s center is due to be completed in 
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2003. Beijing Olympic Games 2008 are expected to further spur the momentum. The 
odds are strong that in less then ten years after China’s entry into the WTO, China will 
become a world hero. Shanghai will be in the vanguard of China’s economic growth as 
a center of finance, distribution, and trade.  
 
Shanghai: a gigantic consumer market 
 China’s economic policy geared to rapid growth has turned Shanghai into a 
gigantic consumer market. The economy’s extraordinary annual growth rate of over 10 
percent in the second half of the 1990s has sharply raised the living standards of its 
residents. As of 2000 according to statistical data average annual wages in Shanghai 
were 18,531 yuans which is more than twice the size of China’s average of 8,346 yuans. 
Currently hot-selling items in the Shanghai market are expensive cosmetics, 
housing-related products, and cellular phones. They are more the attributes of lifestyle 
than daily necessities, evidencing the high living standards of Shanghai citizens. At 
present Shanghai is being overwhelmed by construction boom. High-class apartment 
houses appear one after another and apartments are sold quickly. Consequently the 
demand for housing-related goods is also high. Shanghai’s residents can fully enjoy 
luxurious life with high-class mansions, cosmetics, etc.  
 Cellular phones became necessities in Shanghai. Statistical data on house 
electrical appliances per 100 households is the following: 147 color TV-sets, 102 
refrigerators, and 96 air conditioners. There also were 96 washing machines which 
means that almost every household has it. As of 1997 there were zero cellular phones 
per 100 households, six in 1998, and sixteen in 1999. In 2000 the number rapidly rose to 
29 and there is no doubt that cellular phones will further spread. 
 Major Japanese makers of electrical appliances such as Matsushita, Mitsubishi, 
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Sony, and Sharp all together advance to Shanghai to meet consumers’ insatiable demand. 
And not only biggest companies are the case. The growth of incomes brought about the 
flourishing of fashion industry. Youngsters oriented apparel industry is steadily gaining 
momentum in Shanghai. What seems quite unique is the expansion of bridal services by 
small size companies. A Japanese company specializing in wedding dresses and 
wedding photos in sets was a big success. 
 The rapid growth of incomes has been changing not only housing and clothes, 
but also food menus of ordinary Shanghai’s residents. Traditional Chinese food is 
yielding to McDonalds and Kentucky Fried Chicken while beer is becoming a more and 
more popular substitute for traditional Chinese liqueurs. According to the statistics an 
ordinary Chinese consumes 16 liters of beer annually. In Shanghai the figure is 33 liters, 
or about twice the size of the nation’s average. A Japanese maker’s beer sales in 
Shanghai reached 182,000 tones in 2000. His beer topped the sales of foreign beers in 
Shanghai and seized 40 percent of Shanghai’s beer market. Their capability to meet best 
the tastes of the Chinese and set appropriate prices became the key to success as people 
say. Only those enterprises who studied the habits and lifestyles of the Chinese could be 
on a winners side there. In this sense the business competition is getting more severe. 
 Recently the consumption boom has been spreading from Shanghai to 
surrounding areas. It has expanded from the city of Hangzhou to Ningbo in the south to 
the cities of Suzhou, Wixi, Changzhou, Zhenjiang, and Nanjing in the west, thus 
covering all three adjacent provinces of Jiangsu, Anhui, and Zhejiang. The whole area 
became a new computer production base. Japanese, American, European, and 
Taiwanese electrical and electronic appliances makers are advancing there while more 
and more workers, specialists, and managers settle there as residents. People become 
increasingly wealthy and the tendencies typical to Shanghai are expanding there too. 
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The more Greater Shanghai expands the more expands its consumer market. Even in the 
relation to the development of the western areas that has been given importance in the 
recent years Shanghai plays a foremost role as a distribution center, because of its 
location in the mouth of the Chang Jiang River. 
 
China: the last gigantic automobile market 
 Automobile makers are among those who cast great expectations towards 
potentially gigantic Chinese market. In 2001 China manufactured 2,330,000 
automobiles (8th place in the world), among them 700,000 passenger cars. However in 
2005 China is expected to boost its manufacture volume to 3,200,000 automobiles, 
among them 1,200,000 passenger cars. Though there are problems with traffic 
infrastructure and environment in store, automobile manufacturing in China is expected 
to increase. The major world automobile makers who have been repeatedly reorganizing 
the industry in the last ten years are seriously advancing into China. In the 1980s 
European and American makers such as Volkswagen, Peugeot, and Chrysler were the 
first to set foot in China. In the mid-1990s Nissan, Suzuki, and Toyota of Japan, General 
Motors of the USA, and again Honda of Japan endeavored serious advance into China. 
Since the maximum level of foreign investments for an enterprise has at present been 
limited to 50 percent each foreign company makes joint ventures with such Chinese 
state enterprises as Shanghai Automotive Corporation, China First Automotive Group, 
Dongfeng Automotive Corporation, and Tianjin Automotive Industrial Group. Among 
the world six biggest automakers (GM, Ford, Daimler-Chrysler-Mitsubishi, Toyota, 
Nissan-Renault, and Volkswagen) only Ford lagged behind in terms of advance into 
China. Yet even Ford established Changan Ford Automobile Corporation to 
manufacture light vehicles. Each of the above foreign automakers explores China by 
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making joint ventures with Chinese enterprises.     
 With the advancement of the automakers auto parts manufacturers have also 
begun to seriously advance into China since the mid-1990s. Such European and 
American makers as Bosch, Valeo, Delphi, Federal-Mogul, and Visteon are setting 
production bases in China one after another. In the same way the Japanese leading auto 
parts makers Denso, Aisin, Showa, Stanley Electric, Yazaki, Unisia JECS 
(HitachiUnisia Automotive since October 2002) and others from the mid 1990 also set 
foot in China following the advance of the Japanese car manufacturers. They began 
preparations to supply automakers in China with components. Taiwanese companies 
which have long experience in establishing joint ventures with Japanese companies also 
actively advance in such Chinese provinces as Fujiang and Guangdong. 
 The advancement by European, American, and Japanese automakers coupled 
with the advancement by auto parts makers has become significant from the second half 
of the1990s and especially after China has joined the WTO. Chinese manufacturers are 
not yet strong in producing auto parts. They try to upgrade their technological level 
through establishing joint ventures with foreign companies. The technological level of 
Chinese manufactures has been growing year by year. Yet it will take some time for 
them to reach the level of foreign makers. 
 Rampant copying, which prevails in the Chinese manufacturing of motorcycles 
and their parts, has been expanding to the auto parts manufacturing as well. There is 
lack of legislative restrictions. Still the fact that Chinese manufacturers produce auto 
parts which can compete with those by foreign companies speaks for a certain level of 
Chinese technology. Amidst further advancement by foreign auto parts makers in China, 
the competition among the foreign companies, between the foreign companies and their 
Chinese counterparts, and among the Chinese companies themselves will perhaps only 
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grow. Hence the technological level of Chinese auto parts makers will grow either. 
 
Japan’s ebb 
 Japan though being in the same Asia seems to have only been declining. After 
the golden age of the 1980 the situation for the Japanese economy has changed in the 
1990s. After the collapse of the bubble economy in 1991 the Japanese economy has 
suffered dramatic changes of yen rate, growing financial instability, and the expansion 
of the Asian currency crisis. It has submerged into what is called the lost decade. Even 
the Japanese style management which underlay “the golden age” economy has become 
open to question. 
 In the 1990 even the pattern of overseas advance by the Japanese companies 
changed. Generally speaking the Japanese overseas investment skyrocketed in the 1980s 
reaching its peak of 67.5 billion dollars in 1989. The overseas investment rapidly 
declined after the bubble’s collapse reaching the bottom in 1992. Then they began to 
grow after 1993. In other words in the 1990s the Japanese overseas investments were 
not growing steadily as it was the case the 1980s but rather they entered a period of 
instability with repeated rises and falls (See Figure 2). 
One thing which is interesting about the Japanese overseas investment is the 
growth of investments in manufacturing since the second half of the 1980s. In the 1980s 
the recipients were mostly NIES and ASEAN regions. In the 1990s the Japanese 
overseas investment spearheaded to China. It contributed to the development of Chinese 
regions. There is no exaggeration in saying that the 1990s were the age of investing into 
China. 
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 Not only trade and investment began to transform in the 1990s. Apparent 
changes revealed themselves in the technological transfer and patterns of re-importing. 
In a word, the speed of transferring production from Japan to Asia and the speed of 
re-import to Japan have grown.  
 Let us explain it on the example of Japan-made audio-video appliances  
(Figure 3). In 1960 Japanese makers began to manufacture color TV-sets and for thirty 
years by 1990 were doing so in Japan only. In 1990 Matsushita paved the way to the 
TV-sets re-import by importing Malaysia-made 14-inch type TV-sets. Thus thirty years 
passed between the beginning of the TV-sets manufacturing in Japan and their first 
re-import. Yet with home video tape recorders it took only seventeen years from 1975, 
when they began to be made in Japan, until they were first imported, only ten years with 
CD-players which began to be made in Japan in 1982, for years with wide-TVs from 
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1991, three years with MD-players from 1992, two years with DVD-players from 1997, 
and zero years with APSs which began to be made in 1996 and tamagochi which began 
to be made in 1997. It means that the latter items developed and designed in Japan were 
not being produced there but were instantly moved to production bases in Asia where 
they were finally assembled. Then these items were brought to the Japanese market. 
Moreover, first items were mostly imported from Malaysia, yet from the second part of 
the 1990s imports from China, Taiwan, and Korea began to growii. The tendency 
became even more pronounced after 2000. For example organic electronic 
luminescence and other technologies were jointly developed by Japan and South Korea 
yet production was carried out in South Korea only. In the future the cases of 
development and designing in South Korea and China with subsequent manufacturing 
there will perhaps grow. 
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Figure 3. The duration of home production for AV appliances
Ta 30 years 1960-1990
CTV
1990 - Matsushima imported 14 inch type from its Malaysian
subsidiary.
17 years 1975-1992
VCR
1992 - Sharp imported from its Malaysian subsidiary.
CD Player 10 years 1982-1992
1992 - Sharp imported from its Malaysian subisidiary.
4 years 1991-1995
Wide TV
1995 - Sony imported 16 inch type from its Malaysian subsidiary.
3 years 1992-1995
MD Player
1995 - Sharp imported from its Malaysian subsidiary.
2 years 1997-1999
DVD Player
1999 - JVC, Matsushita, Sony, and other companies imported
 from their Malaysian and Chinese subsidiary.
0 years 1996-1996
APS
1996 - Canon, Minolta, and Ricon imported from their Malaysian,
Taiwanese and Chinese subsidearies.
0 years 1997-1997
Tamagochi
Bandai imported from China in 1997.
0.5 years autumn 2000-March 2001
Degital TV
2001 - Toshiba imported from China.
0 years 2001-2001
Organic EL
2000 - NEC and Samsung jointly developed and imported from
 South Korea in 2001.
Source: “Kyoso kozo no henbo to keizaigaku no kadai” in Nijyuisseiki keizaigaku no kadai t
(Issues and Perspectives of Economics in the 21st Century). Chikura, 2002.  
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The growth of overseas production by the Japanese companies 
 It is noteworthy that the share of overseas production by the Japanese 
companies is growing (Figure 4). In the manufacturing sector the share of overseas 
production (the sales of overseas juridical person?the sales of juridical person in 
Japan) was lower than 10 percent in the first half of the 1990s. Yet in the second half it 
broke out of the 10 percent mark and approached 15 percent in 2000. The picture is 
almost the same with Japan’s overseas advancing enterprises as a whole. In the first half 
of the 1990s the share of overseas production (the sales of overseas juridical person?
the sales of juridical person in Japan) lingered at 10 percent mark. However in the 
second half of the 1990s it broke through 20 percent mark and rapidly climbed up to 30 
percent thus approaching the USA – the industrial hollowing out leader among 
advanced nations. These figures tell us of how dramatic the overseas shift even within a 
single enterprise was. Transportation equipment and electrical appliances manufacturers 
hold the top two in the share of overseas production. Mostly they have been shifted to 
North America and Asia. Recently China has been attracting attention. 
In the beginning of 2002 Japan’s Ministry of economics, trade, and industry 
conducted a survey targeting Japan’s 700 leading manufacturing companies on the 
subject of overseas shift. The results back the above assumptions. According to the 
survey in the recent years 100 of 700 companies, or one out of seven which means 15 
percent, performed an overseas shift or planned it. More than half of those companies 
were manufacturers of TV-sets, refrigerators and other electrical appliances (32 percent), 
general equipment (14 percent), and ceramics-cement (9 percent). Textile and food 
manufacturers were 5 percent each. Most of the overseas shifts were to China (40 
percent), followed by Thai (8 percent), Taiwan (4 percent). Coupled with other 
destinations to South East Asia (28 percent), the shifts to Asia totaled 80 percent, half of 
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which were to China. The shipments and sales of the shifted companies were destined to 
the countries and regions of location (46 percent), to Japan (32 percent), and to third 
countries (22 percent). More than half of respondents (57 percent) referred to cheapness 
of personnel costs as the main reason for overseas shift, while the second important (22 
percent) was the reason of overseas markets explorationiii. 
 
Figure 4. The rate of overseas advace
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 Until the early 1990s the shift to China prevailed in rather low-tech industries 
such as textiles and food. However from the second half of the 1990s it has been 
expanding from low-tech apparel such as Uniqlo to electrical appliances and general 
equipment, computer software of NEC, Fujitsu, and other high-tech businesses. 
 All types of industries and technologies have been overtaken by the shift to 
China. There has been great difference in the scale and placement of enterprises. Big 
company’s shift to China results in the lessening of orders to small subsidiaries in Japan. 
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To stay afloat they also have to shift overseas. This chain effect is running through 
Japan like tsunami. It will terminate at the point when all Japan’s local industries go to 
China. Let us have a look at the overseas shift by 806 enterprises from ten industry 
concentrated areas of Japan. 25 percent are precise machinery makers of Suwa City in 
Nagano Prefecture. More than ten are electronic component makers of Yamagata City?
in Yamagata Prefecture, bicycles and music instruments makers of Hamamatsu City in 
Shizuoka Prefecture, and metal works of East Osaka City and Ohta District in Tokyo. 94 
percent of overseas shifts are to Asia with China at the lead holding 40 percent aloneiv. 
 
Japan and China’s business conditions 
That is what we call the advance of China and retreat of Japan. It has become an 
aspect in a sequence of changes from the second half of the 1990s. Now lets see the 
reasons that brought about these changes. This time the advance of China was 
conditioned by reforms, openness, and the course for the market economy which made 
her investment market attractive. On the contrary Japan has relatively lost such 
attractiveness. Let see the comparison of business conditions from the report prepared 
by Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) in February 2001 (See Table 1)v. The 
report analyses wages, office leasing fees, Internet access fees, educational level, etc. in 
the nine Asian cities of Soul, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, 
Manila, and Yokohama. Japan has the cheapest Internet connection fees. Yet it tops the 
list in terms of wages, and is relatively high in office leasing fees. However its grade is 
relatively low in terms of TOEFL and IMD educational tests. Thus a Japanese city 
(Yokohama) is overwhelmingly inferior to Chinese Shanghai in terms of investment 
conditions. Besides, though not shown here in figures, Japan’s internal transportation 
high costs and other inefficiencies largely undermine her competitiveness.  
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Seoul Shanghai Hong Kong Bangkok Singapore Kuala Lumpur Jakarta Manila Yokohama
South Korea China Thailand Malasia Indonesia Philippines Japan
962? 285? 2314? 173? 3390?
1301 463 2514 384 4064
1511? 434? 2342? 350? 4953?
1989 907 4467 793 6001
30.69? 11.33? 18.00? 10.27? 26.45?
62.79 14.16 25.00 12.44 32.89
114.02
tp 20 perso
*???Survey by JETRO from Nov 2001; in US dollars; ???Country's average level (with the exption
Source: Nikkei Shimbun. June 11, 2002 (morning edition)
1631 24.491184.21 230.7
34 49 36 33
Table 1. Business Environment in the main cities of Asia
1510 337
?
technicians' salary (per
month)
?
middle level managers'
salary (per month)
712 138
9.9
61.01
1249
2087
59.69
31.92
302
622
224 207 233 183206
25
194 253
41 12
about 30
289.96
211
48
34.5
31.15
202
31
?
?
?
?
monthly office rent (per ?sq
m)
monthly Internet fee
TOEFL avarage level ?July
2000?June 2001?max. 300
IMD educational level
?2002)
 
 
The second factor is that China possesses labor force which is superior to that of 
Japan in terms of quantity and quality. On the one hand 1.3 billion of Chinese is ten 
times bigger than 130 million Japanese. China has a gigantic labor force circulation 
system when migrant workers from rural inland areas come back home after several 
years of work in the maritime areas. Japan exhausted such circulation system in the 
period of rapid economic growth of the 1960. Contrary to China, which has such a 
circulation between rural and urban areas, she cannot maintain cheap wages by means 
other than importing cheap foreign labor force. But this difference in the population size 
between China and Japan reveals itself not only in migrant workers but also in such 
decisive factor as the number of qualified engineers with university diplomas. China 
produces 1.97 million university graduates annually against Japan’s 550,000 (data from 
2001). China has become a “brain power” exceeding Japan several times. 
The third factor which divides China and Japan is that China entered the age of 
economic growth in the 1990s. In the global sense the 1990s were the “time of new 
technologies disclosure”. China managed to grasp this chance but “post-bubble” Japan 
failed to do so. Three things conditioned the “time of new technologies disclosure”. 
First there was a disclosure of American advanced technologies, mostly information 
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technologies after the Cold War. Second there was a disclosure of advanced military 
technologies by the former Soviet Union which again related to the end of the Cold War. 
And the last there was an outflow of Japan’s high technologies in manufacturing on 
which we would dwell further. These three factors have drastically and rapidly raised 
China’s technological level. China, a “brain power”, had enough capacity to fully 
absorb advanced technologies. 
 The fourth factor which divides China and Japan is the size of the Chinese 
market. China can be largely divided into three areas according to the level of incomes. 
These are the maritime areas, which are best symbolized by Shanghai District hosting 
more than 200 million people, the inland western areas, which on the contrary are rarely 
populated but rich in land and mineral resources, and central areas which are something 
in between the first two. There are areas like Shanghai District where average annual 
per capita GDP is about 30,000 yuan. And there are areas like three inland provinces of 
Shanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, and two autonomous districts of Ningxia and Xinjiang-Uighur 
where average annual per capita GDP is about 5,000 yuan (China Statistical Yearbook 
2002). China has got a multilevel market which can respond to various needs 
conditioned by income differences. Japan cannot compete with China in terms of 
market elasticity. 
 
Rapidly advancing technology drain 
 We attempted to compare Japan and China’s economy conditions in four 
aspects. It has already been mentioned that the 1990s were the time of “new 
technologies disclosure”. Japan’s manufacturing sector was by no means exception in 
terms of rapid “technology drain”. Traditionally the overseas expansion by Japan’s 
manufacturing sector was linked to strong dollar. The regional international division of 
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labor followed the pattern when high value-added items were supplied by Japan while 
relatively cheap items were produced abroad and either shipped to Japan or used locally 
for assembling. The details could vary depending on the industry, but the pattern was 
basically the same through the automobile to electrical industries. Thus the overseas 
shift was mostly limited to middle and low level technologies. There was almost no 
shift of high technologies. However this pattern largely changed in the 1990s.  
 The prime reason is the expansion abroad of technological research and 
development by Japanese companies due to the shortening of production period at home 
and the growth of re-import as was the case with audio-video appliances. One more 
reason is the advance of mergers and acquisitions by foreign capital from the second 
half of the 1990s (See Figure 5). Mergers and acquisitions saw their peak in Japan in 
1990 when there were more than 800 of them. Later until 1993 their number was 
decreasing and fell to approximately 400. It began to grow again from 1994 gaining 
momentum and approaching 1,200 in 1999. Most of these mergers and acquisitions 
were of IN-IN type (Japanese companies buying Japanese companies). Yet from 1998 
the OUT-IN M&A (foreign companies buying Japanese companies) began to grow. By 
1999 their number almost approached the number of IN-OUT type (Japanese companies 
buy foreign companies). It has become difficult indeed to preserve high technology in 
Japan when foreign companies buy Japanese ones in order to get hold of their high 
manufacturing technologies. Reportedly the name of the game of the French Renault’s 
capital tie-up with Nissan was to obtain Nissan’s technologies of automatic 
transmissions and hybrid engines. The evidences are that the same reasons underlay the 
purchases of Ogiwara, a world famous molding company, and Niles, the automobile 
switches and sensors maker, by Ripplewood from the US.  
 20
Figure 5, M&A?basic types?
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Not only the US, but also Chinese, South Korean, and Taiwanese companies 
try to get hold of technologies purchasing Japanese companies. Thus China’s Shanghai 
Electrics (Group) Corporation and Morning Side, an investment company from Hong 
Kong, purchased Akiyama Printing Machinery, a company located in Tokyo Katsushika 
Ward which fell into management crisis. The newly established company received the 
name of Akiyama International (president Hu Xiong-Xiang). Chinese companies turned 
their attention to the world-top double-side synchronous printing technologies. They 
spent mere 2 billion yen to obtain those technologies and fifty specialistsvi. By the way 
in 1992 Akiyama Printing Machinery had the sales record of 14.3 billion yen. The new 
owners are going to exploit Akiyama’s brand. Immediately they are making 
middle-level items in China and high-level things in Japan, and prepare to transfer 
technologies to China. 
 
China’s catch up and Japan’s response 
 In the beginning of this chapter we introduced two different standpoints on 
China’s contemporary economy. The first standpoint takes China’s advance as real and 
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argues that in the 21st century China will surely become “global factory”. The other 
standpoint argues that the former is an overestimation and from the point of 
intermediate capital and capital goods China’s competitiveness is open to question.  
 We think that China’s catch up is real thing and believe that in the 21st century 
China will surely become “global factory”. Indeed China’s industrial production is 
increasing, the more her export increases the more intermediate capital and capital 
goods will be imported from Japan. Yet will such import of intermediate capital and 
capital goods last forever? Definitely no. China is gradually producing more and more 
of them locally, and local goods are substituting for imports from Japan. It means that 
China’s catch up with Japan is real thing. 
 So, how the Japanese enterprises should respond to such a situation? There is 
no sense to adopt antagonistic stance towards China and hinder shift of technologies to 
China. Moreover this may be harmful. Not China but Japan will feel uneasy as a result. 
If not Japan, the West, South Korea and Taiwan can provide technologies and capital to 
China. The Japanese companies should actively advance to China in both technologies 
and capital. They should set production bases in China’s various regions according to 
their peculiarities. 
 However there are important preconditions for conceiving such a policy. First 
Japan should continuously develop new technologies. That is the way it can coexist with 
China and other Asian countries. Second it should secure the reception of high royalties 
for new technologies and again invest them in the further development of new 
technologies. The Japanese government on its part should render active patronage to 
enterprises in their technological development and copyright protection. 
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2. The Strengthening of China-South Korea and China-Taiwan Economic 
Relations 
 
South Korea is drifting apart from Japan 
 There have appeared changes in Japan-South Korea economic relations in the 
21st century. Until now Japan-South Korea economic ties were developing in line with 
the relations between the two countries that had been laid by the Japan-South Korea 
Treaty from 1965. In a word the peculiarity of South Korea’s foreign economic relations 
was a lasting from year to year deficit in the trade with Japan. The size of South Korea’s 
deficit in the trade with Japan was much bigger than the deficits in South Korea’s trade 
with any other country. The deficit in the trade with Japan was the main reason for 
South Korea’s foreign trade deficit. As for investment policy South Korea was mostly 
investing in the nations of South-East Asia. Yet recently there have been considerable 
changes. 
 
Figure 6. South Korea's export & import
*For 2001 the period is from January to August. 
Source: www.customs.go.kr  
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which had been the third main destination of South Korea’s exports after the USA and 
Europe. And in 2001 Japan even yielded her position to China. Though recently Japan 
has remained the first exporter to South Korea, it has been ahead by a narrow margin. 
Moreover the gap between Japan and China’s export to South Korea has been shrinking. 
Furthermore China - Japan and China - South Korea overall trade turnover has been 
expanding while Japan - South Korea trade turnover declining (See Figures 6-8). 
Figure 7, South Korea's overseas investment
*?For 2001 the period is from January to August. ?Statistics on China excludes Hong Kong.
Source: Overseas Economic Information System (OEIS), www.koreaexim.go.kr/oeis  
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 Let us see the volume of South Korea’s overseas investment. In the second half 
of the 1990s the USA held the first position as a destination for South Korea’s overseas 
investment while China and South East Asia shared the second position. However in 
2001 the investments to China became second to the USA only. Moreover China has 
risen to the first position in the quantity of investment cases. On the contrary, South 
Korea’s investments to Japan have been very small, making 1-2 percent of her overall 
overseas investment (Figure 7). 
 Thus in the 2000s Japan-South Korea economic relations have been weakening 
while China-South Korea ones strengthening. There has emerged a “thick pipe” 
between China and South Korea. It has begun to throw shadow on Japan-South Korea’s 
economic relations. 
 In April 2001, President of South Korea (at that time) Kim Dae-Joong at the 
meeting with the delegation of Chinese “People’s Daily” energetically called for 
strengthening mutual relations. In May of the same year the Chairman of the National 
People’s Congress (at that time) Li Peng while visiting Seoul greeted the strengthening 
of economic relations between the two countries. In September of the same year South 
Korea’s Consulate General was opened in China’s Guangzhou City. At present China 
and South Korea have been getting closer. Indeed it is unlikely that China-South Korea 
economic relations will weaken in the future taking into consideration their common 
gains and losses in relation to the perspectives of the Chinese market and their support 
of North Korea’s moves to reforms and liberalization. The economic relations in 
North-East Asia which have been revolving along Japan-South Korea axis are rapidly 
losing their importance been replaced by China-South Korea relations. 
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The expanding influence of China’s economy 
 South Korea’s drift from Japan is also expressed in the situation with economic 
agreements between the two countries. There have been efforts to lift custom duties and 
other taxes to expand trade between Japan and South Korea, and finally conclude free 
trade agreement. In 2000 there has been made serious progress in relation to the 
conclusion of a treaty on taxes and an agreement on investments. The agreement on 
investments between China and Japan came into force in January 2003. Yet the 
agreement on free trade between Japan and South Korea has only been considered. 
 If such free trade agreement between the two countries is concluded South 
Korea’s deficit in trade with Japan will only increase. Furthermore the advance of 
Japanese enterprises into South Korea will be accelerated. This has been the main 
reason for South Korea’s disinclination. However there should be noted South Korea’s 
efforts to conclude a Japan-China-South Korea trilateral economic agreement. One of 
the explanations is the already mentioned rapid expansion of China-South Korea 
economic relations. Indeed if we take into consideration the ebb of Japan and the 
advance of China in the recent years there is no doubt that in ten years by the time when 
the agreement will have materialized the role of Japan will have further declined. 
 On the other hand when joining the WTO China revealed a strong inclination to 
strengthen relations with South-East Asia, South Korea, and Taiwan through foreign 
capital, reforms, and the open door policy. The fact is that in the end of 2000 China 
called upon the ASEAN to establish a board on elaborating the frames of free trade zone 
is just one example. The ASEAN also responded to the suggestion of establishing East 
Asia economic zone which would include China, Japan, and South Korea. But this 
response seems only natural taking into consideration the gigantic expansion of China’s 
industry.  
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The history of South Korea’s industry overseas shift 
It has not been that long since South Korea’s industry began to shift overseas. It 
really began only in the second half of the 1980s. With the three principal conditions 
(low price for crude oil, low exchange rate, and low interest rates) at the base South 
Korea’s enterprises endeavored overseas shift to escape the growth of wages at home 
due to violent labor disputes, and the appreciation of won. They sought cheap labor. Let 
us see the real progress of overseas shift. In 1985 there were only 38 cases with the sum 
of investments not exceeding 110 million dollars. Yet in 1990 there were 340 cases with 
960 million dollars of investment. Judging by the number of cases and the sum of 
investments there was almost nine-times increase. In 1995 there were 1324 cases 
totalling 3.11 billion dollars. Thus compared with 1985 the number of cases grew 35 
times while the sum of investments increased 28 times. 
South Korean enterprises mostly advanced to Asia. However in 1992 the 
normalization of diplomatic relations with China gave them an impetus to advance into 
China. In 1996 among 1,466 cases of South Korea’s overseas investments totaling 4.39 
billion dollars 734 cases (about 50 percent), and 890 million dollars (about 20 percent), 
went to China. Labor-intensive manufacturing of sundries, textiles, apparel, and leather 
goods became the main locomotive of South Korea’s foreign investments. The amount 
of investment per case was 2.97 million dollars in 1985; 2.82 million dollars in 1990; 
and 2.35 million dollars in 1995. A relatively small scale speaks for itself. 
However the Asian Currency Crisis of 1997 caused changes in the South 
Korea’s overseas investment. In 1997 there were 1,319 cases of overseas investment 
totaling 3.56 billion dollars. However in 1998 there were 608 cases totaling 4.7 billion 
dollars. The number of investment cases dropped. Yet in 1999 there appeared signs of 
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recovery. Due to the Asian Currency Crisis the number of overseas investment cases and 
their volume declined but the sum per case began to grow. Thus in 1998 it grew up to 
7.74 million dollars. There also appeared a tendency of overseas investment by 
technology-intensive industries such as electronics, car manufacturing, and 
semi-conductors.  
 
The features of the industrial hollowing out 
 It is hard to say looking at the present situation with the South Korean 
economy and the degree of its overseas shift (the declared overseas investments?the 
total internal capital investments) that the industrial hollowing out has become serious. 
Let us see the degree of overseas shift according to the types of industry (Table 2).  
Table 2. The rate of South Korea’s industrial hollowing out?
Industry Rate 
leather goods 
wooden furniture 
metal hardware assembly 
textiles and clothing 
electro-electronics 
non-metal minerals 
transport equipment 
foods and drinks 
polygraphy 
oil-chemistry 
primary metal-works 
40.8% 
35.5 
21.9 
20.2 
8.2 
7.8 
7.7 
5.9 
4.5 
4.2 
3.3 
*? Reported overseas investment?domestic capital investment 
**? Cumulative basis for the 1991-2000s 
Source: Lee, Ji-Pyong. Hollowing Out of Industry and Response of Enterprises. Seoul: LG 
Economic Research Institute, 2002.  
 Leather goods top the list (40.8%), followed by wooden furniture (35.5%). 
Than follows metal hardware assembly (21.9%) and textiles and clothing (20.2%). 
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These are the top industries in terms of industrial hollowing out. They are in turn 
followed by electric appliances and electronics manufacturing (8.2%), non-metall 
minerals (7.8%), transport equipment (7.7%), foods and drinks (5.9%), polygraphy 
(4.5%), oil chemistry (4.2%), and primary metal works (3.3%). There is a vivid gap 
between leather goods, wooden furniture, metal hardware assembly, and textiles and 
clothing on the one hand and other items. With the former the degree of overseas shift 
varies from 20 to 40 percent while with all the latter this figure is below 10 percent. The 
former are typical labor-intensive industries where the wages make high share of costs. 
The latter however are less vulnerable in this respect. In case of Japan the degree of 
overseas shift has been more than 20 percent in electric appliances and electronics 
manufacturing also. So, for South Korea the hollowing out of industry is a matter of the 
future. 
 
Leisure goods manufacturers are the first to shift overseas 
 A South Korean manufacturer of tents, bags, and other leisure goods Jin Woong 
Corporation can serve a good example to illustrate the situation with the overseas 
investments. The company was established in March 1979. At that time South Korea’s 
market of leisure goods was small. That is why the manufacturing mostly targeted 
foreign markets and produced for export. The subsequent appreciation of won and rapid 
rise of wages at home that took place in the second half of the 1980s put the company’s 
management under high pressure.  
 The company decided on the overseas shift. In April 1988 the company began 
negotiations through the mediation by KOTRA (Korea Trade-Investment Promotion 
Agency) with Xiamen open coastal economic zone in China’s Fujian Province and a 
company from Hong Kong to determine a placement. In November of the same year 
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after visiting the spots and negotiations from July to September the license was obtained 
from the Department of industry and trade of Xiamen City People’s Government. After 
obtaining the overseas investment permission from The Bank of Korea there was 
established a wholly owned local juridical person with the capital of 300,000 dollars. In 
February 1989 the factory was up and running. It had 119 employees, and mostly 
specialized in making tents. Mere seven moths passed from the beginning of the 
destination search to the establishing of juridical person, and ten months passed until the 
factory was running. In the first operational year Jin Woong Corporation produced 
deficit of 45,000 dollars but from the next year it got into the black and was bringing 
profits since then. Jin Woong Corporation is an example of South Korea’s early pattern 
of overseas shift by small size sundries manufacturers.          
      
 
The advance of South Korea’s auto parts makers into China 
 Meanwhile in contrast with the previously described leisure goods South 
Korea’s auto parts makers have not been showing the same activity in advancing into 
China. South Korea’s automobile industry got birth in the 1960s. KIA Industries began 
from 1962 while Hyundai was established in 1967. Later in 1982 there was established 
Daewoo Motors. Ssang Yong appeared in 1988 but was soon absorbed by Daewoo. In 
1998 Samsung also entered automobile manufacturing. Thus in 1998 South Korea’s 
automobile industry was represented by four makers: Hyundai, KIA, Daewoo, and 
Samsung.  
The Asian Currency Crisis, which became serious in the beginning of 1998, did 
not make an exception for the South Korean automobile manufacturing. The criticism 
against monopolistic enterprises was rising. KIA suffered bankruptcy and was absorbed 
 30
by Hyundai. Daewoo became bankrupt in 2001. In the end of 2000 Samsung Motor was 
absorbed by Renault and received the name of Renault-Samsung. In 2002 Daewoo 
entered under GM’s umbrella and began to recover. After suffering a drop in 1998 South 
Korea’s automobile production has been growing since 1999. In 2000 South Korea 
made a production record of 3.11 million cars of which 1.68 million were exported. 
South Korea’s car manufacturing was about one third of Japan’s home manufacturing  
(Figure 9).  
Figure 9. South Korea's Automanufacturing (Production&Export)
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South Korea’s auto parts manufacturing also suffered a serious drop in 1998. 
Yet in 2000 it began to recover. In 2001 the industry comprised 270,000 employees and 
1,075 enterprises. Among them 28 enterprises (3%) had more than 1,000 employees 
while the rest were mostly of medium and small size. 427 enterprises (40%) which 
makes almost half had less than 50 employeesvii. 
  
Only 32 of South Korean auto parts manufacturers (less than 3 percent) have 
advanced into China. With the exception of Hyundai MOBIS which has a wholly owned 
plant in Shanghai with 3,000 employees, the majority of South Korean enterprises in 
China are of medium size with several hundred people. South Korean enterprises mostly 
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concentrate in China’s northeastern areas such as Tianjin Municipality, Shandong 
Peninsula, Shenyang City, and Changchun City.  
Such items as switches, air conditioners, key sets, and others which South 
Korean enterprises manufacture in China besides the auto parts are also of low and 
middle technological levels. There has been no serious moves by South Korean 
enterprises to establish engine, engine control equipment, and transmission related 
production in Chinaviii.   
Only one of ten South Korea’s auto parts makers has set production base in 
China against more than 30 percent of Japan’s ones. There is an impression that for 
South Korea it is a matter for the future. Nevertheless KIA has begun talks with 
Dongfeng Automotive Corporation to join hands in producing sedan vehiclesix. Also 
Hyundai has set Pekin Hyundai Automotive to produce “Sonata” modelx. Looking at 
these moves we can conclude that the advance of South Korea’s auto parts 
manufacturers into China will definitely increase. 
 
Home-market oriented J-company 
 The overseas shift by South Korean companies has just begun. A J-company 
which we are going to introduce here has not been immediately concerned about 
moving into China. J-company is located in an in industrial area of Taejōn city. The 
company has been specializing in making bolts for automobiles. The company’s capital 
is 5 billion won (about 4.3 million dollars in 2001) and there are 220 employees (in 
2001). The company’s annual sales are 35 billion won (about 30.4 million dollars in 
2001). So the company belonged to South Korea’s medium-size auto parts 
manufacturers. The company was established in 1978. Since then Hyundai has been the 
main destination for the company’s production purchasing 56 percent of the company’s 
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sales in 2001. Than followed Fassun R?A (21% in 2001) and KIA (10% in 2001). 
 Let us have a look at the company’s sales progress. In 1994 the sales were 14.3 
billion won. Since then the sales were growing year by year and set a record of 20.6 
billion won in 1997. In 1998 Hyundai was hit by troubles in IMF and lessened its 
purchases. The J-company’s sales in 1998 were only 14.6 billion won thus declining by 
30 percent from the level of the previous year. However in the next year the sales 
showed quick signs of recovery and reached 22.7 billion won. In the next 2000 they 
reached 31.8 billion won, and in 2001 hit 35 billion won. 
 The sales rose due to rationalization, which brought about personnel cuts, and 
the rapid increase of orders from Hyundai. Cheap won was also favorable for boosting 
export of bolts to the Middle East, Mexico, Germany, and Japan. J-company even set a 
new factory in Chungcheong Buk-Do Okcheon-Gun county preparing to meet the 
increasing demandxi. There have been no plans to advance into China. To satisfy the 
rapidly growing demand from Hyundai the company at present has been mostly 
preoccupied with upgrading her technologies at the plant in Taejōn city.  
 
The East Asia amidst Japan-South Korea competition 
 The age when Japan was preserving the leading positions in industrial products 
manufacturing came to an end with the turn of a century. The issue for the 21st century 
is how to share the market and technologies between Japan, South Korea, and China, 
and how to elaborate a good system of international industry division. In this sense the 
matter of how to create a good system of international industry division poses crucial 
importance. It is because Japan and South Korea though being rivals in the Chinese 
market are also in cooperative relations there. Indeed both Japan and South Korea are 
competing in China in establishing multipurpose electrical appliances manufacturing 
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there. For both of them this is a locomotive of their advance into this country. On the 
other hand in China they have got opportunities for alignment in supplies procurement, 
mutual aid in production processes, and other fields. In the same way as Nippon Steel 
has implemented the SCM (supply chain management) system used by POSCO it is 
necessary to introduce technologies from South Korea which is an advanced IT-nation. 
In other words the trade war over China’s market between Japan and South Korea, 
which are in rival-partner relations there, should be used wisely. In this sense free trade 
agreement between Japan and South Korea becomes an important issue for the Japanese 
strategy in East Asia in the 21st century.  
 
The continental shift gained momentum 
 There have also been “great changes” in Taiwan, mostly in its IT-industry. At 
present the shift of its production base to China has been gaining momentum. According 
to the survey by The Taiwan Institute of Economic Research the share of the Taiwanese 
IT-production shifted to China was 28 percent in 1995 and grew rapidly to 53 percent by 
2000. In the same period the share of goods made in China by Taiwanese companies 
rose rapidly from 14 to 37 percentxii. The rapid growth of 25 percent in six years cannot 
be called otherwise than “great change”. In Taiwan they call it “exodus of industry”, in 
more conventional terms it is a progressing hollowing out of industry. 
 The recent changes are not only expressed in dry figures. The overseas shift 
comprises a wide spectrum of industries from low-tech to high-tech ones.  
 There is nothing new in the shift of low-tech industries from Taiwan to China. 
Mostly this related to labor-intensive production of equipment and parts such as CD, 
CD-ROM, DVD, CD-RW, CRT-monitors, desktop PCs, scanners, motherboards, 
computer periphery, and relatively cheap computers. In five years by 2000, 90 percent 
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of scanners, 80 percent of CD-ROM, DVD, and CD-RW production bases were shifted 
to China. 
 Yet in the recent years it has expanded to notebook PCs, 8-inch wafers (the 
base-plates for semiconductors) and other high added value items. Their production 
bases have also been moving to China or preparing to do that. 
 Until now the Taiwanese authorities banned the shift of notebook PCs and 
8-inch wafers manufacturing technologies to China. Yet recently the regulations have 
been loosened and the shift to China accelerated. Moreover there is strongly enrooted 
public criticism towards the policy of restrictions conceived by Chen Shui-bian. For 
example in March 2002 there took place a demonstration of several thousand people 
demanding prolongation of the opportunity to invest in notebook PCs and 8-inch wafers 
manufacturing in Chinaxiii.  
 Against these developments the unemployment rate in Taiwan has been more 
than five percent. At present more than one million Taiwanese workers reportedly work 
in China for Taiwanese companies. Taiwan’s labor active population is about 9.7-9.8 
million people which means that 10 percent or each tenth Taiwanese works in China. 
The shift of industry to China and the creation of jobs there have been immediately 
influencing Taiwan’s employment rate. 
 Taiwanese export to China has also been growing recently. In 2002 Taiwan’s 
export to China exceeded Taiwan’s export to the USA thus making China the main 
destination of the Taiwanese goods. This was definitely a result of the rapid growth in 
IT-components export to China caused by the lift of bans on the transfer of notebook 
PCs and 8-inch wafers technologies (See Figure 10).  
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Figure 10. Taiwan's export destinations
*Calculated on the basis of the data  from the Bureau of finance and the Bureau of Economy.  Source: Nikkei Shimbun. Aug
? ? ? ? Moreover the dependence of Taiwan on exporting to China is greater than 
China’s dependence on exporting to Taiwan. Taiwan is exporting to China machines, 
instruments, electrical equipment, and plastics, i.e. the items related to the investments 
in China by Taiwanese companies. On the contrary China’s export to Taiwan is not only 
small in the amount of money, but also has little relation to investments. Raw materials 
prevail in it. The patters similar to those that emerged in China’s trade with South Korea 
were being repeated in China’s trade with Taiwan. 
 The policy of direct communications, direct ship lines, and direct trade has not 
yet been fully implemented. However in both cases the trend is getting stronger. On the 
contrary similarly to Japan’s economic relations with South Korea her economic 
relations with Taiwan are also suffering definite decline. 
 There comes an age when Taiwan’s economy will be strongly influenced by the 
movements in China’s economy. The Taiwanese authorities have been seriously 
concerned with the possibility of Taiwan’s economy becoming part of China’s. There 
exists an opinion that investing to South-East Asia also should diversify risks. Yet such 
concerns cannot withstand the attractiveness posed by continental China. 
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 Similarly to South Korea it has not been long since Taiwan’s industry began to 
advance overseas. This shift began in the second half of the 1980s. In 1987 the 
exchange rate of the Taiwanese yuan rose sharply reaching the level of 28.5 yuan for 1 
dollar. By 1992 it rose to 25.5 yuan. This resulted into rapid overseas advance by 
labor-intensive industries. The manufacturing of toys, Christmas lamps, artificial 
flowers, rubber gloves, and other goods up to electrical home utensils was steadily 
moving overseas. At first South-East Asia was the main destination. The Taiwanese 
were rapidly advancing into South-East Asia by exploiting local Chinese networks. 
 In 1990 the Taiwanese authorities gave their conditional recognition to trade 
and investment to China which they had not been recognizing before. The investments 
to China have been gradually growing since. They have been growing with the 
extension of the list of investment items recognized by the Taiwanese authorities. 
Gradually the items have been changing from relatively low-tech products like 
calculators to technologically high ones like electronic dictionaries and translators. 
Taiwanese electronic makers were mostly concentrating in the Zhu Jiang delta in Dong 
Guang City of Guangdong province. Yet in 2000 Taiwanese enterprises’ investment 
destination shifted from Guangdong to Suzhou City and Shanghai in the Chang Jiang 
delta. The production items also vary from power supply devices and keyboards of 
Guangdong to notebooks PC of the Chang Jiang deltaxiv. 
 The Taiwanese continental investments to the Chang Jiang delta especially 
accelerated after the bans on notebook PCs and on wafers were lifted in February 2001 
and in April of 2002 respectively. Yuske Mizubashi who for several times after April 
2000 made field research of the Chang Jiang delta’s “electronic belt” has been reporting 
the growth of Taiwanese investment in the areas of Suzhou, Kunshan, Wu Jiang, 
Pudong, western part of Shanghai, and Ningbo. Envisaging the lift of ban on notebook 
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PCs Taiwanese companies promoted construction of a plant in the Chang Jiang delta 
already in the beginning of 2000. They began a trial production in the end of 2001. By 
2002 these developments have made the Chang Jiang delta into the production base 
responsible for one fourth of the world’s notebook PC productionxv. 
 
The miracle of the Taiwanese IT-industry 
 Taiwan is a little smaller in size than Japan’s Kyushu Island. Its population is 
about 23 million. It has not been long since Taiwan has won the world’s attention as a 
“Silicon Island”. In the 1970s Taiwan entered the phase of rapid growth and became one 
of the NIES, alongside with South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore, which became 
altogether referred as “four little dragons”. The electrical industry performed as 
locomotive of Taiwan’s rapid growth. The main role was after home electrical 
appliances manufacturing. 
 In the 1980s home electrical appliances manufacturing yielded to 
semiconductor industry. First the technologies were polished with the OEM (original 
equipment manufacturer) production obtained from European, American, and Japanese 
multinational companies. At the next stage developing skills were accumulated through 
the ODM (original design manufacturer) production obtained from the same European, 
American, and Japanese companies. Then Taiwan became responsible for the massive 
production of EMS (Expanded Memory Specification). It was that time when Taiwan 
rose to a semiconductor production base taking the advantage of mobility of its small 
and medium size enterprises. To avoid the appreciation of yuan and to cope with the 
demands for wage increase from the second half of the 1980s Taiwanese enterprises 
began to advance into the ASEAN countries. That was the starting point of the 
hollowing out of Taiwan’s industry. Upon entering the 1990s the main destination of 
 38
Taiwanese foreign investments changed from the ASEAN countries to China where the 
market economy was advancing. That gave further impetus to the hollowing out of 
industry in Taiwan. 
 Taiwanese direct investment into China has been expanding like the flow from 
a broken dam. In the beginning the investment mostly went to the seashore areas of the 
Zhu Jiang delta like Guangdong Province. From the second half of the 1990s they 
covered the areas of the Chiang Jiang delta like Shanghai and Jiangsu Province. Power 
supply, PC keyboards, transformers, resistors, condensers, and monitors manufacturing 
is concentrated in the Zhu Jiang delta. On the contrary the notebook PC manufacturing 
is mostly expanding in the Chiang Jiang delta. 
 
The IT-industry within the world network 
    Taiwan’s IT-industry rapidly grew against the expansion of the world 
network by IBM, Intel, as well as Japanese and South Korean multinational 
semiconductor enterprises. The Taiwanese IT-industry expanded due to a smart using of 
this network through receiving OEM orders. Indeed the strength of Taiwanese 
enterprises is in their ability to mount on this network. We can say that this has been a 
traditional skill of Taiwan’s industry. 
 In the 1970s when Taiwan’s home electrical appliances industry got a start 
Taiwanese enterprises began to encroach into home electrical appliances manufacturing 
in Southeast Asia as a part of the East Asian Economic Zone which was created by 
Japan in the 1950. Home electrical appliances manufacturing did not go alone. At that 
time machine building, auto parts, plastics and other chemical goods manufacturing, 
and other various industries were established with the assistance from Japan. Taiwanese 
enterprises performed as partners of the Japanese ones in their opening of South East 
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Asia.  
 
 In the 1980s Taiwan’s IT-industry emerged from the home electrical appliances 
manufacturing. At this time it mounted on the new currents of the American, European, 
Japanese, and South Korean semiconductor enterprises. It became trusted with their 
OEM production. In the 1990s after the technologies were brushed up Taiwanese 
enterprises began to advance into South East Asia by using the East Asian Economic 
Zone in order to cope with the appreciation of yuan and wage increase demands at 
home.  
 Again in the second half of the 1990s using the opportunities from the opening 
of the special economic zones in China’s coastal areas Taiwanese enterprises began to 
advance into China. Indeed they possess splendid capability of using networks.  
 Taiwanese enterprises are mostly of small and medium size. Many of them are 
of “one owner” type. That is why Taiwanese enterprises are often referred as having 
quick legs. If they go they come like storm, if there are troubles they retreat at once. 
Such quick decisionmaking and mobility is best suit for the industries like IT where one 
can operate with relatively small capital and where the most important thing is 
management information. It would not be an exaggeration to say that IT-industry is like 
being especially created for Taiwan. There is nothing to lament about the Taiwanese 
IT-industry which by 2000 grew into a world IT-production base. 
 Taiwan’s small and medium size enterprises are short of money. That is why 
they cannot put much into research and development. Thus they follow the Western and 
Japanese companies playing the role of their international subcontractors. In the world 
network they look for giant enterprises that possess most advanced achievements. They 
become their subcontractors, organize massive production, and fill the world market 
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with goods. That is how Taiwan established its name as a world IT-production base.    
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